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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JESS JI~IENEZ, 
Plai'Y/)tiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RAY O'BRIEN and BOYD BYRON 
BROADW A~ER, 
De1fendants and Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF F AC.TS 
Case No. 
7264 
This appeal involves the validity of certain releases 
signed and delivered by the plaintiff, Jess Jimenez, Au-
gust 14, 1945, the time when he left the hospital and the 
following September 5th, for personal injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident of July 9, 1945. Plaintiff ad-
mitted the execution of the releases, but claimed that 
they were invalid by reason of total mental incompetency 
at the time of ,fueir ·execution (See plaintiff's Reply, Tr. 
60-2). 
Jimenez, age forty-one when the accident occurred 
(Tr. 181), had been residing at 221 West 4th South for 
about three years. Prior ther·eto, he came from Pueblo 
' 
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Colorado where his mother and brother were still liv-
ing. He had three children by Rita Gounis, his former 
wife, who was driving the car in which he was riding at 
the tim·e of the accident. When injured, he had just term-
inated his employment repairing shoes at the Boston Shoe 
Repair Shop on Third South (Tr. 183-192). He also testi-
fied to having had experience as a boiler maker (Tr.182). 
Plaintiff was rendered unconscious on account of 
the accident and taken to the County Hospital for a few 
hours and then to the St. Mark's Hospital where here-
mained from July 9th to August 14th, 1945. X-rays re-
vealed there were no fractures (Tr. 260). The injury was 
diagnosed by Dr. Stewart Alma Wright, the attending 
physician, as a severe brain contusion (Tr. 246-7). 
His stay in the hospital was marked by a period of 
unconsciousness and semi-consciousness. Dr. Wright 
testified there was gradual improvement, plaintiff suffer-
ing a set-back the eighth or tenth day, but from thereon, 
he responded to measures that were used (Tr. 247). He 
was watched by Dr. Wright very carefully (Tr. 249) and 
regular progress notes were made by him to see if he 
was recovering (Tr. 262). By July 29th, he was "clear 
mentally." (Tr. 265). Plaintiff showed steady improve-
ment after August 1, 1945 (Tr. 274). By August 11th he 
was "increasing his activity daily" and "had no com-
plaints whatever" (Tr. 265). For the last few days prior 
to the time he, plaintiff, left the hospital, August 14th, 
he was ambulatory and walked around and was able to 
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pi tal, Dr. 'y right made a complete exmuination and re-
check to make sure he was normal (Tr. 266). He (Dr. 
Wright) · • had every reason to expect plaintiff would 
continue to improve from that time on, if he took care 
of himself.'' (Tr. 27±). 'Vith reference to August 14th, 
he said: ··I don't thinK he was irrational, in my opinion, 
on that date." ( Tr. 269). 
The nurses' daily record (Ex. 8) kept at the hospital 
for the purpose of showing· the medications and treat-
ments given, all observations made, and the way the 
patient reacts and responds and any complaints that he 
has or other symptoms (Tr. 416) confirmed plaintiff's 
steady recovery, as did Dr. Wright's progress reports 
(Ex. 7). 
The attending nurses, Mary L. Pierce and Margaret 
Anderson, both testified that on August 14th and for 
several days prior thereto, Jimenez conversed normally 
and there was nothing irrational or incoherent about his 
speech or his actions ( Tr. 420, 424-5). No medications of 
any type were adniinistered August 14 (Tr. 258). He had 
regular visitors at the hospital, including Rita Gounis, 
his daughter, a brother from Colorado and other friends. 
Ben Duncan, the insurance adjuster for Farmers 
Inter-Insurance Exchange, 1114 Continental Bank Build-
ing, insurer of the O'Brien car, first called at the St. 
Mark's Hospital to interview Jimenez July 13th, four 
days after the accident. Plaintiff was then under seda-
tives, so Mr. Duncan excused himself (Tr. 382), calling 
again about a week later when "he (Jimenez) was much 
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better.'' Jimenez conversed and related his family back-
ground, but did not recall the facts of the accident. Dun-
can said that no attempt to obtain a written statement 
at that time was made ( Tr. 383). He thereafter made 
repeated visits, six or seven in all, during which time 
Jimenez would recognize him and carry on regular con-
versations (Tr. 383). Other than being a little weak, 
there was nothing unusual about his appearance. One 
time, about August 1st, Duncan found him walking 
around outside the ward ( Tr. 384). 
On August 13th, in order to get a statement from 
plaintiff, Mr. Duncan employed Alice Pannier as a secre-
tary to take the matter down in question and answer 
form. (Tr. 385). This statement, Exhibit 10, showed 
plaintiff to be entirely rational at that time, giving a 
clear, concise answer to all questions, including his en-
tire background. At that time Jimenez explained his 
plans to leave with his brother for Colorado, the next 
day (Tr. 38). 
Duncan returned to the hospital during visiting 
hours that evening and discussed settlement (Tr. 387). 
The amount of the doctor and hospital expense had not 
been ascertained, but a tentative settlement was agreed 
upon in the amount of $1,000 general damages, plus the 
hospital and doctor bills (Tr. 388). Duncan then contacted 
Dr. Wright and ascertained the amount of his doctor 
bill ($500) and the hospital bill ($182.05) (Tr. 389). On 
August 14th, while Mr. Duncan was in the insurance of-
fice at the Continental Bank Building, someone phoned 
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him from the hospital (apparently on behalf of Jimenez) 
(Tr. 389) requesting that he come over. He thereupon 
took with him insurance company drafts and releases in 
accordance with the terms of their propos-ed settlement 
(Tr. 390). He found plaintiff fully dressed sitting on 
the bed with a blonde lady friend and his suit case at 
the foot of the bed (prepared to leave the hospital) (Tr. 
390). Duncan ·explained the releases and drafts in detail. 
Then in accordance with the practice of the insurance 
company, he took what he ealled a supporting statement 
in long hand. This statement (Exhibit 9) in the hand-
writing of Mr. Duncan recited the facts of the accident; 
that he suffered a brain contusion and that he was hos-
pitalized until his release that day. It further stated: 
"I understand that the sum of One Thousand 
Six Hundred and Eighty-Two Dollars and Five 
Cents is all the money I will receive from any 
source as a result of the accident of July 6, 1945. 
I understand that my injury may be of a per-
manent nature, and by my own choice I choose to 
settle in full of claims of the accident of July 6th, 
1945.'' 
Then at the bottom, Jimenez in his own handwriting 
wrote: 
''This statement is true. 
Jess Gimenez.'' 
A usual form release (Exhibit 6) in the amount of 
$1682.05 was voluntarily signed and delivered by Jim-
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enez, who in his own handwriting likewise wrote at the 
bottom: 
''I have read this releases and understand it 
to be a release in full. 
Jess Gimenez" (Tr. 391). 
Three insurance company drafts were signed and 
delivered to Jimenez, one payable to Jess Gimenez and 
St. Mark's Hospital in the amount of $182.05, a second 
draft to Jess Gimenez and Dr. Alma Wright for $500, 
and a third draft payable to Jess Gimenez for $1,000. 
These drafts were each duly endorsed by plaintiff, Dr. 
Wright and the Hospital and cashed in the due course of 
business through Walker Bank & Trust Company and 
the First National Bank. The $1,000 draft payable to 
Jimenez alone was presented to and paid by the Walker 
Bank & Trust Company August 22, 1945. Each draft (see 
Exhibits 1, 3 and 4) above the endorsement reads: 
"Endorsement of this draft constitutes a re-
lease of ail claims, known or unknown, the under-
signed has or may have against Farmers Auto-
mobile Inter-Insurance Exchange and the insured 
and any other person on account of any and all 
claims arising out of the accident referred to on 
the face hereof.'' 
After getting out of the hospital, plaintiff changed 
his mind about going to Colorado and said he decided to 
stay in Salt Lake (Tr. 200). 
Plaintiff was next seen by Mr. Duncan the following 
September 5th when he, plaintiff and Rita Gounis called 
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at the insurance office in the Continental Bank Building, 
on which occasion plaintiff reminded Duncan that he 
had promised to pay all his hospital bills and that there 
was one which he, Jimenez, had neglected to mention, and 
that was $26.35 incurred at the General Hospital for 
emergency treatment immediately following the acci-
dent (Tr. 393). Upon presentation of this bill, which had 
been overlooked, :Mr. Duncan issued a draft for the 
stated amount payable to plaintiff (See Exhibit 2) which 
contained a similar recital to the other drafts. This was 
duly endorsed by Jimenez, delivered to the Salt Lake 
County Hospital, which likewise endorsed, and it was 
cleared through the banks in the regular course of busi-
ness. 
Immediately after Jimenez left, it occurred to Mr. 
Duncan, that for payment of the $26.35 he should get a 
further release, so he caught up with Jimenez in the Bank 
Building lobby and asked him to go back up to the office 
and sign another release reciting the $26.35 consideration 
(Tr. 394). Jimenez acknowledged the voluntary ~execution 
of this release (Exhibit 5), as he did the first one ( Tr. 
341, 343). His attitude was entirely friendly (Tr. 394). 
In his own handwriting, he wrote at the bottom of the 
latter release : 
"I have read these release and understand it 
to be a release in full. 
Jess Jimenez" (Tr. 395). 
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There was nothing unusual about his manner of con-
versation, appearance or speech on that occasion (Tr. 
395). 
Later on account of tiredness and inability to sleep, 
plaintiff says he saw Dr. Wright to see if the doctor could 
calm him down ( Tr. 184). The visits wer·e made to Dr. 
Wright's office September 15th and November 1st, 1945. 
The doctor recommended rest from work and a mild seda-
·tive (Tr. 258). On those occasions the doctor conversed 
with plaintiff, who understood him, and r•esponded clear-
ly. There was nothing irrational about his appearance 
(Tr. 259). 
The first steps to commence this suit were taken Oc-
tober 16, 1945 (Tr. 208) when the first summons (Ex-
hibit 11) was served. The complaint on file her·ein was 
signed by plaintiff December 15, 1945 ('Tr. 208), and filed 
December 31, 1945 (Tr. 6). 
Plaintiff complained of getting worse (Tr. 209) and 
about November, after the first summons was served, 
he went to Colorado, staying at his mother's place in 
Pueblo ( Tr. 185). He got worse when he rode the train 
''that is what really got me.'' He stayed in bed for a 
time (Tr. 209). He felt worse for about a y•ear (Tr. 185, 
206). 
In Pueblo, he saw Dr. J. L. Rosenbloom, Assistant 
Superintendent of the Colorado State Hospital, as a 
private patient at the Corwin Hospital. He made visits 
to see Dr. Rosenbloom November 8th, November 15th, 
November 29th and December 15, 1945, the following Feb-
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ruary 3th, :J[arch :28th and August 5, 1946, and July 7, 
1947 (Tr. 356). 
The only other doctor he saw was Dr. Garland H. 
Pace, neurologist and psychiatrist on one occasion in 
October, 1947, (Tr. 311), more than two years after the 
time of the releases. 
Plaintiff returned to Salt Lake in August or Sep-
·tember, 1946, (Tr. 185). He obtained employment operat-
ing an ·elevator in the Continental Bank for about a week. 
He then worked from September into December at the 
Tooele Ordnance Depot (Tr. 186, 200); then for four or 
five months he worked in :Magna for Babcock and Wilcox 
taking care of a tool room ( Tr. 187-8, 200). He stayed in 
Colorado during the summer of 194 7 ( Tr. 188). He re-
turned to Salt Lake the following September or October 
and obtained employment at the Anderson Dam in Idaho 
for a couple of months (Tr. 188). He then worked in 
periods (Tr. 188). At the time of the trial he was working 
at Devil's Slide but was off to attend the trial. There he 
was engaged in putting up a water tank in-the air, work-
ing on a scaffolding one hundred fift·een to one hundred 
twenty feet high ( Tr. 189, 204, 205). His only complaints 
then were inability to stay with his customary work con-
tinu~msly as he used to do (Tr. 189), and that he still did 
not sleep well (Tr. 190). 
Plaintiff's attorneys acknowledged in open court 
(Tr. 149) that Jimenez was not mentally incompetent at 
the time of commencement of suit (the first summons was 
served October 16, 1945; the complaint actually filed De-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
cember 31, 1948), and further stipulated that the re1eases, 
drafts, etc., were all signed by plaintiff (Tr. 336). 
Jimenez retained all of the benefits and money re-
ceived by him through the settlement and at no time 
made any offer or tender to return the consideration re-
ceived by him. 
The court directed a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant Ray O'Brien, the owner of the other automobile in-
volved in the accident, there being no proof of agency or 
independent negligence on his part. 
As to the defendant, Boyd Byron Broadwater, the 
driver of said automobile, the court submitted the case 
to the jury on the sole issue of mental competency to 
executje the releases. The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount 
of $5,000, less $1708.40, the amount received by Jimenez, 
or a net verdict of $3,291.60 (Tr. 447). Defendant's mo-
tion for new trial was denied (Tr. 447-8). The defend-
ant, Boyd Byron Broadwater, has appealed from judg-
ment. 
QUES.TIONS ON APPEAL 
The errors raised on this appeal relate entirely to 
'two matters, namely: 
1. The insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
finding of mental incompetency at the time of the execu-
tion of the releases, August 14th and September 5,-1945; 
and 
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2. The question of ratification by reason of plain-
tiff's accepting the benefits of said settlement and fail-
ing to tender or offer to return the benefits of said set-
tlement. 
ASSIGN~IENT OF ERRORS 
The court erred in the following particulars: 
1. In denying the defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict (Tr. -±36-8), and in refusing defendant's requested 
instruction No. 2 ( Tr. 105), for a directed verdict in 
favor of the defendant Boyd Byron Broadwater, duly 
excepted to ( Tr. 445) . 
2. In submitting the issue of mental competency to 
the jury by giving its instruction No. 4 (Tr. 91), No. 5 
(Tr. 92), duly excepted to (Tr. 444) and instruction No. 
14 (Tr. 99), No. 14a (Tr. 100), and No. 15 ('Tr. 101), each 
duly excepted to (Tr. 445). 
3. In overruling defendant's motion for a new tria:l 
(Tr. 447-8). 
AUTHORITIES 
Right of individuals to make a compromise settle-
ment of personal injury claims by contractual release is 
discussed in Anderson v. O.S.L., 47 Utah 614, 155 Pac. 
446. The court pointed out that it is not necessary ~that 
the parties can at the time foresee or contemplate every 
possible consequence that may subsequently arise from 
an injury. Said the court: 
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"Fortunately such is not the law. If it were, 
settlements, instead of becoming the means of 
avoiding strife and unnecessary litigation, would 
become a most prolific source of both. The gen-
·eral rule respecting the legal effect of such re-
leases is well stated by the Supreme Court of 
Texas in the case of Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mc-
Carty, 94 Tex. 298, 60 S. W. 429, 53 L.R.A. 507, 
86 Am. St. Rep. 854. * * * 
'' 'Where a party, who has a claim against an-
other for personal injuries, agrees upon a settle-
ment of his claim, and accepts a sum of money or 
other thing of value in settlement of such claim, he 
is, in the absence of fraud or concealment, con-
cluded in the settlement, is a proposition sus-
tained, as we think, by one unbroken line of 
authority,' citing numerous cases." 
AUTHORITIES AS TO MEN·TAL CAPACITY 
The test of mental capacity is stated in Ratch v. 
Hatch, 148 Pac. 433,46 Utah 218, as follows: 
" 'In ordinary contracts the test is, Were 
the mental faculties so deficient or impaired that 
there was not sufficient power to comprehend the 
subject of the contract, its nature and its prob: 
able consequences, and to act with discretion in 
relation thereto, or with relation to the ordinary 
affairs of life~' '' 
In that case the action was to set aside two deeds on the 
grounds of mental incompetency and undue influence. 
The deeds were executed January 31, 1908 and June 1, 
1908. The grantor di~ed December 2, 1911, at the age of 
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eighty-two. This court held that the evidence was in-
sufficient to authorize a finding that the deceased ''at 
the time he made the deeds in question was not possessed 
of sufficient mental capacity to make valid conveyance of 
his property.'' The court further added : 
"Nor is the evidence sufficient to authorize a 
finding that the deceased, at the time he made the 
deeds in question, was not possessed of sufficient 
mental capacity to make valid conveyances of his 
property.'' 
"Nor does Comp. Laws 1907, Section 4001 
(now Sec. 102-13-20 of the probate code defining 
an incompetent) referred to by counsel for appel-
lant, change the test. To hold that under all the 
facts and circumstances disclosed by the record 
before us the deceased did not possess the neces-
sary mental capacity to enter into and execute or-
dinary contracts affecting property and property 
rights would result in laying down a rule whereby 
most all of the transactions of aged men and 
women who had some mental defects could be 
successfully assailed in courts of ·equity. No gen-
eral or hard and fast rule which shall govern or 
control in all cases can be promulgated, but every 
case must, to a very large extent, be determined 
upon the facts and circumstanc-es present in that 
case.'' 
The court made the following observations of the 
evidence: 
''There is much evidence to the effect that 
during the last five or six years preceding his 
death the deceas·ed suffered 'lapses of memory to 
the extent that in the same conversation he would 
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ask the same question two or three times. A doc-
tor, a grandson of the deceas-ed, testified that his 
failing memory and his general mental condition 
was the result of a disease known as 'arterial 
sclerosis,' which, he said, caused a 'hardening of 
the arteries,' which resulted in what the doctor 
called attacks of epilepsy, or what are commonly 
called epileptic fits. It was shown that the de-
ceased had several .of such attacks, the first one 
along in 1906 and several more thereafter during 
the later years of his life. Indeed, it is contended 
that he suffered an attack the day or evening pre-
ceding the 1st day of June, 1908, the day the last 
deed in question here was executed, but from some 
other evidence the court was justified in ·entertain-
ing some doubt with regard to that question. It 
was also made to appear that usually an attack 
would produce unconsciousness which would at 
times last for several hours, and that the attacks 
would affect the deceased's mind more or less for 
some time thereafter. A large number of witnesses 
testified with respect to the mental condition of 
the deceased, but we think the deductions from 
the facts detailed in the evidence are perhaps best 
reflected from the testimony of Abram C. Hatch, 
the plaintiff. * * * We copy his statements in that 
regard from the bill of exceptions as follows: 
'' 'There were times between 1906 and 1909 
when his mind was much better than it was at 
other times, and I would say that at times during 
that period from 1906 up to 1909-up to Decem-
ber, 1908, I will put it-he might have been com-
petent to transact ordinary business with which 
he was acquainted, and other times for quite 
lengthy periods of times when he was, in my 
opinion, absolutely incompetent; then from on or 
about December, 1908, until his death there were 
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Yery great differences in his condition of mind. 
He had these attacks. I don't know what they 
were. During the attacks he was unconscious, and 
after it was reported that he had another attack, 
it was considerable time before he was what I 
would call rational, so that he could do business 
at all. ~-\.nd from 1904-I would say the latter part 
of 1903-I noticed from the latter part of 1903 
that he was at times unfit and incompetent to 
transact business, but I will say that in my judg-
ment from 1905 he was in a condition so that any 
one in whom he had confidence might have over-
reached him in a business transaction very well, 
very easily'." 
:Jir. "\Villis, a lawyer who prepared and acknowledged 
one of the deeds among other things testified: 
''He had, as lots of people do, a failing of 
memory somewhat as people do when they grow 
older. I suppose he understood what he was doing 
when he executed those deeds, but I had reason to 
think otherwise from what he said afterward. 
Right at the time he executed these deeds I think 
he knew what he was doing, and I accordingly 
took his acknowledgment and I certified in that 
acknowledgment that he duly acknowledged to the 
execution of that deed.'' 
In O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 Pac. (2d) 
770, the court reaffirmed the same test as to competency 
and held that the grantor, a woman of eighty-six years 
of age, was as a matter of law legally competent to exe-
cut,e the deed, notwithstanding testimony of a Mr. Giles 
"that her mental condition was very bad in March, 
1930" (the deed having been executed about September 
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30, 1929). Dr. Root testified that "she was of unsound 
mind in March, 1930, and that this condition had existed 
for s~even or ·eight years.'' 'The court remarked that from 
his testimony as a whole that her condition was one of 
forgetfulness and not of incompetency, and that it was 
evident from ihe whole of his testimony that her un-
soundness of mind consisted of an inability to recollect 
and a straying of the mind from the subject of the con-
versation, he having admitted that she "understands 
what you say and has all the time, and evidently under-
stands all she says.'' 
In 'Bawson v. Hardy, 86 Utah 50, 39 Pac. (2d) 755, 
the ~uit was to set aside a deed executed by the plaintiff, 
an inmate of the State Mental Hospital at Phoenix, 
Arizona. The deed was dated June 1, 1923. The record 
disclos,ed that plaintiff had been three times committed 
to mental hospitals, once in 1912, once in 1913 and recom-
mitted the same year, and once again in 1928. The last 
committment said: 
"The diagnosis in this case is that of De-
mentia Praecox of paranoid type, which I con-
sider a chronic and incurable mental disease.'' 
The court in holding there was no evidence to justify a 
finding of incompetency as to the execution of the deed 
commented upon the fact that the testimony of witnesses 
concerning some of the things done and the tendencies 
manifested by the grantor were things that might be 
termed oddities or peculiarities, but that none of it was 
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sufficient to justify a finding of mental incompetence 
as to the execution of the deed. 
Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 103, 71 Pac. (2d) 185 was 
a suit to set aside a deed dated September 16, 1933. 
Grantor was 78 years of age in ill health, having died 
September 25, 1933, nine days after ·eX!ecuting the deed. 
It was alleged that grantor was ''wholly incompetent to 
transact business.'' The Supreme Court reviewed the 
entire case as an equity matter and reversed the find-
ing of the lower court wherein the lower court found the 
grantor was incompetent and held that under the evi-
dence grantor was competent as a matter of law. The 
facts show that grantor was seriously ill for three or 
four weeks before his death and several witnesses de-
scribed him as being incompetent, delirious, flighty, etc. 
The court said : 
"That while he was a sick man and getting 
weaker day by day and having difficulty of speech 
on account of having lost his teeth and some ap-
parent soreness, yet he was able to talk about the 
affairs of the day, of his travels, of the farm and 
its care, and to recognize his friends when they 
called. The witnesses for plaintiffs who say that 
he rambled in his talk or was delirious seemed to 
use this word in a rather inaccurate way. The 
rambling apparently was that the old man would 
change from one subject to another and even 
these witnesses give very little report of any 
actual delirium. 
The judgment and decree of the trial court is 
reversed and set aside. * * * '' 
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He,ath v. Arwovitz, 102 Utah 1, 126 Pac. (2d) 1058, 
was a proceeding to appoint a guardian of an alleged in-
competent. In holding the evidence was insufficient to 
prove incompetency under 8ection 102-13-20, the Court 
said: 
''The section implies physical or mental de-
fects which interfere with the rational functioning 
of the mind. If the mind functions rationally but 
the individual acts in a way commonly designated 
as eccentric-that is, his acts deviate from the 
usual principally because he is less susceptible to 
public opinion than are many of us-he is not in-
competent. 
''Such confusion as appears in his answers 
apparently arises either from defective hearing 
or ignorance of the facts or law but those answers 
do not show a mind laboring under difficulty of 
functioning.'' 
''The evidence must show a lack of power to 
function-not an unwillingness to or lack of in-
terest in functioning, be the latter two ever so 
reprehensible as personal characteristics.'' 
See also Chadd v. Moser, 25 Utah 369, 71 P. 870. 
In Pope v. Bailey-Marsh Go., (N. Dak.), 151 N. W. 
18, it was held error to deny defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict where releases were questioned 
upon grounds of mental incompetency and fraud, al-
though plaintiff disclaimed any knowledge of executing 
the release and claimed to be in great pain and suffering 
at that time, while employees of the hospital and the 
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party taking the release testified to his apparent ration-
ality. The court said: 
• · * * * we are forced to the conclusion that 
plaintiff, \Yho concededly had the burden of proof 
of showing facts relieving him of the legal effect 
of such formal release by clear and convincing 
proof, has failed in meeting such burden. 
•' * * * written instruments cannot be im-
peached for fraud or any other cause except upon 
proof that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing, 
and of such a character as to leave in the mind of 
the chancellor no hesitation of substantial doubt.'' 
In San Antonio & A. P. Rai.lway Oo. v. Fo.Zka (Tex.), 
124 S. W. 226, the court held the evidence insufficient 
to find lack of mental capacity to e~ecute a release, not-
withstanding !the releasor's wife's testimony that she 
noticed a difference in his mental condition after the 
injury, such as his loss of pride, loss of self respect, dis-
regard for his wife and child, his sloppy dress, double 
vision and various peculiarities such as: ''He would call 
me and when I would get into the room and ask him 
what he wanted, he would say he uev;er called me." 
In Carlson v. Elwell (Minn.), 151 N. W. 188, plain-
tiff signed a release in the hospital on July 25th but 
claimed he had no recollecdon of the matter, having 
no m~emory from July 18th, the time of an operation, till 
September. Others testified to plaintiff's ability to talk 
fair English, answer questions intelligently, though he 
seemed to lack education and appeared t.o be dull. Dr. 
Collins, superintendent of the hospital, testified that 
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plaintiff was irrational at times during the Winter and 
Spring, but that at other times he was rational and in-
telligent. The person taking the release, plaintiff's at-
torney on the case, testified concerning the execution of 
the release under circumstances when plaintiff evidently 
knew what he was doing. The court revers·ed a judgment 
based on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and ordered 
judgment entered for the defendant. 
INADEQUACY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE 
In the instant case, plaintiff attempted to prove 
mental incompetency through opinion evidence of Drs. 
Rosenbloom and Pace. Neither of •these witnesses saw 
plaintiff until after steps were taken to commence suit 
and until after the lapse of several months' time from the 
execution of the releases, when circumstances and con-
ditions had changed. When plaintiff first saw Dr. Rosen-
bloom November 8, 1945, plaintiff had just suffered a set-
back, had gotten sick on the train, became worse in bed 
several days. He then complained ·of dizziness, headaches, 
instability, disturbed sleep, etc., whereas at the time of 
the releases, he, plaintiff, had "no complaints." 
He was never seen by Dr. Pace except for the one 
examination of October, 1947, over two years after the 
second release of September 5, 1945. No treatment was 
given or recommended. 
Of the several friends and relatives who visited 
plaintiff at the hospital, the only one called by plaintiff 
as a witness was l\1:rs. L. D. Loy, a close friend who re-
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lated an incident in the hospital when plaintiff told about 
having a gun under the bed and having shot some pigeons 
which she was to take home, and other oddities and in-
consistencies in his actions before he left for Colorado 
(Tr. 22-1-2-11). Even she testified that befor·e he left the 
hospital, he was walking around and !that sometimes he 
appeared very rational, talked rationally and was ration-
al as far as she could see at those times (Tr. 241). 
PLAIN"TIFF'S TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff at the time of the taking of his deposition, 
September 12, 1947, and at the !trial recalled facts and 
details with accuracy. He related specific details which 
occurred before the accident such as going to the clean-
ers, arranging for the car, himself doing· part of the 
driving, that he did not have a driver's license (Tr. 
190-5), his friends and relatives at the hospital and 
num·erous details as to the time and place and details of 
his work (Tr. 180-223, 328-349). His only personal com-
plaints after he got worse were nervousness, tiredness, 
sleeplessness, etc. He remembered having a conversation 
with Ben Duncan, the adjuster, August 14th (Tr. 340). 
He remembered that day, the day he got out of the hos-
pital very plainly because it was V-J Day (Tr. 183). 
Remembered discussing settlement (Tr. 342). He read 
and thought he understood the release (Tr. 343) and 
voluntarily signed (Tr. 341, 343). Plaintiff said, "He 
(Duncan) told me that he was going to fix the hospital 
bills and get a release and he would give me $1,000 and 
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so I was concerned about getting out of there and I didn't 
care about nothing else.'' (Tr. 342). It was his under-
standing that he was being paid $1,000 plus medical and 
hospital expenses (Tr. 348). He remembered cashing the 
$1,000 draft without any trouble (Tr. 338) . 
.As to September 5th, he knew he had the bill to pay 
at the County Hospital when he went up to the bank 
building that day (Tr. 337). He identified Duncan in the 
courtroom as the man who took the release (Tr. 332). 
Remembered signing the release ('Tr. 331). Said Dun-
can "wanted me to come back and do something to sign 
a release * * * he mentioned release.'' Remembered get-
ting his check and leaving (Tr. 334). Remembered that 
the check was given to him for the County Hospital (Tr. 
336), because the bill down there had not been paid. He 
remembered endorsing the check (Tr. 337) and taking it 
to the County Hospital (Tr. 338) . 
.ARGUMENT 
It seems apparent from plaintiff's own testimony 
that he not only understood the na:ture and terms of the 
settlement of .August 14th, but that his understanding of 
the same was confirmed and interpreted by himself when 
on September 5th, about {hree weeks later, he discovered 
the County Hospital bill for $26.35 had been overlooked, 
and went to the insurance office and requested Mr. Dun-
can to take care of that bill in accordance with their 
agreement. 
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Plaintiff's later cmnplaints of fatigue, sleeplessness, 
forgetfulness, etc., the usual subjective symptoms in per-
sonal injury suits, did not n1ake him incompetent, much 
less incompetent on AuguS't 14th or September 5, 1945, 
when he had "no complaints." All who talked with him 
August 14th, and the undisputed hospital records showed 
that he was rational, conversed with people and under-
stood them. The nurses were entirely disinterested wit-
nesS'es. No one, not even :Mrs. Loy, a close friend of plain-
tiff, could admit of any irrationality on those dates the 
releases were executed. None of plaintiff's other friends 
and relatives, of which there were several who visited him 
regularly at the hospital, were called by plaintiff to 
testify. At the hospital on and prior to August 14th, and 
for about three weeks between August 14th and Septem-
ber 5, 1945, plaintiff had plenty of opportunity to think 
the matter over and seek advice or legal counsel. 
However, he was planning to leave for Colorado the day 
he left the hospital and was anxious to get his money. He 
was feeling all right and had "no complaints." He knew 
he was being paid $1000.00 general damages plus his hos-
pital and medical expenS'e. He read and understood he 
was signing a general release. He said he was concerned 
about getting out of the hospital and ''didn't care about 
nothing else.'' While later he may not have gotten along 
as well as expected, it was not many months before he 
was back to work, and at the time of the trial, he was 
working full time in skilled industrial work from a high 
scaffolding, a more responsible and remunerative job 
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than his work repairing shoes before the accident oe-
curred. 
August 14th and September 5, 1945, were the dates 
on which the releases were ·executed, and if plaintiff was 
mentally competent to sign a contract or release and 
transact ordinary business on either one or both of those 
dates, the settlement was conclusive so far as he was 
concerned, and it became the duty of the trial court to 
so direct the jury. 
RATIFICATION BY RETAINING BENEFITS 
Even if it should be assumed that plaintiff was in-
competent to execute the releases of August 14th and 
September 5th, 1945, upon regaining his competency, 
(and he was admittedly competent when suit was com-
menced that Fall), it then became his duty to return the 
benefits received in the settlement ( $1708.40) if he sought 
to disavow or rescind the contract. By accepting and 
retaining all of the benefits, he thereby again ratified and 
confirmed the settlement. 
AUTHORITIES AS TO RATIFICATION 
In Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624, the action 
was to set aside a release on the grounds of fraud. Plain-
tiff did not offer to return the consideration, $200.00, 
prior to bringing suit, but did make a tender in open 
court, which was refused by defendant. While the court 
suggested that tender prior t~ bringing suit did not defeat 
plaintiff's recovery, in that the $200.00 previously paid 
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could be deducted from the verdict by the court without 
prejudice to the defendant, however, that decision did 
not pass upon the question involved in this case, nam,ely: 
Whether, assuming plaintiff to be incompetent when he 
signed the releases, it was his duty after admittedly re-
gaining competency that Fall to either affirm or dis-
affirm the contract and offer to return the benefits re-
ceived by him if he sought to rescind the releases. 
In M,orris v. G.reat Northern Railway Co., (Minn.) 
69 N. W. 628, the court held that failure to tender or re-
turn the consideration precluded plaintiff's right to 
maintain a suit. The court said: 
"Conceding plaintiff's mental incapacity on 
that day, there is an insuperable obstacle to his 
recovery in the fact that he has never rescinded 
nor offered to rescind the settlement but still re-
tains the consideration and has never offered to 
return it. 
"Upon recov·ering his usual mental condition, 
it was his duty to elect promptly, that is, within 
a reasonable time, whether he would affirm or 
disaffirm and if he elected to do the latter, it was 
his duty to restore or offer to restore what he 
had received so as to place the parties in status 
quo. He cannot affirm in part and reject in part. 
He cannot escape the burdens of the contract and 
retain its benefits. '' 
In Gibson v. Western New Yor-k and P. R. Co., 30 
Atl. 308, the court similarly held and said: 
"It was his duty when he first learned of the 
existence of the release to disavow it and at least 
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before suit was brought, return or offer to return 
the money received under it. 
''Plaintiff cannot both affirm and disaffirm, 
cannot affirm for what he got and disaffirm for 
the difference between that and what he hoped to 
get * * >ll'. His keeping the money * * * after re-
storation to mental health with undoubtedly 
knowledge as to where the money came from and 
why, is only consistent with an intent to affirm 
the contract.'' 
See also Walker v. Harbison (Pa.), 128 Atl. 
732; West v. Se.aboard Air Line R. Co., 151 N.C. 
231, 65 S. E. 979; Mahr v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
170 Fed. 699; Roggenkamp, Exr'x v. Marks et al, 
2 Auto Cases 974, (Ill.) 19 N. E. (2d) 828; Brown 
v. Walker Lu.mber Co., 128 S. C. 161, 122 S. E. 670. 
Retaining the benefits was not only ratification by 
the plaintiff in the instant case, but it is not equit,able or 
proper to permit plaintiff to retain all the benefits of 
settlement, and at the same time gamble on a more favor-
able ·verdict, that is, he should not be permitted to eat his 
cake and have it too. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit: 
1. Plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof 
that he was mentally incompetent to contract or sign the 
releases either of August 14th or of September 5, 1945, 
but the evidence is to the contrary that he was mentally 
competent on those dates. 
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2. That the plaintiff reaffirmed and ratified the 
settlement of August 14th on September 5, 1945, by in-
terpreting the contract of settlement in demanding pay-
ment of the County Hospital bill, thereby confirming his 
understanding thereof. 
3. That had the evidence been sufficient to prove 
mental incompetency on August 14th and September 5th, 
plaintiff again ratified and confirmed the settlement 
when he regained competency shortly thereafter and re-
tained all of the benefits of the setUement without tend-
ering return of the same. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
reversed with directions that judgment be entered for 
the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON, 
E. F. BALDWIN, JR. 
Attorneys for Defend(J!fl,.t and 
.Appellant, Boyd Byron 
Broadwate.r. 
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